INTRODUCTION
The conventional account of our remedial tradition recognizes that courts may engage in discretionary public interest balancing to withhold the specific remedies typically administered in equity.
1 But it generally does not acknowledge that courts I adopt Fallon and Meltzer's methodology and, looking to the doctrines and practices that comprise the modern law of constitutional remedies, seek to draw lessons from the distinct ways in which the modern Supreme Court has treated substitutionary and specific constitutional remedies with respect to public interest balancing. Building from a functional account of the law of constitutional remedies, I advance a two-part hypothesis that the Court's behavior traces an appropriate constitutional boundary. The hypothesis is as follows. First, substitutionary constitutional remedies, while integral to the proper functioning of our constitutional order, are individually contingent and susceptible of legislative or judicial expansion, contraction, or replacement as the perceived public interest dictates. But second, specific relief must be available for justiciable and meritorious claims of constitutional right to which neither a judicial federalism nor a statutory diversion doctrine applies, and an effective constitutional remedy ultimately must be available even in these exceptional cases.
I have organized the paper in the following way. Part I covers some preliminary points about the premises and scope of my argument, and the method I employ to classify constitutional remedies. Part II provides an account of the range of recognized constitutional remedies that classifies in terms that are functional (specific or substitutionary) rather than historical (equitable or legal). Classifying constitutional remedies in functional rather than historical terms is conducive to both a defense and an understanding of the paper's foundational descriptive claim. Part III employs this classification to demonstrate that modern courts frequently apply doctrines grounded in public interest balancing to withhold substitutionary relief for wholly realized constitutional violations despite the fact that doing so leaves such violations entirely without a remedy. In contrast, when faced with claims for specific relief, courts do not invoke the public interest to withhold relief altogether. Part IV connects the described reality to the debate over constitutionally necessary remedies and hypothesizes that the different ways in which the modern Supreme Court has treated substitutionary and specific constitutional remedies with respect to public interest balancing reflects an appropriate sense of the constitutional necessity of each.
I. PRELIMINARIES
The topic of constitutional remedies is extraordinarily rich. It is the subject of an enormous and fascinating academic literature that exposes fault lines that run beneath, and sometimes jolt, our constitutional order. It will therefore come as no surprise that the pedigree and legitimacy of many of the substitutionary and specific constitutional remedies described in Part II, and many of the remedy-limiting doctrines discussed in Part III, are subjects of profound and basic disagreements. These disagreements reflect fundamentally different ideas about the nature and scope of the "judicial Power" that Article III of the Constitution confers on the federal courts, and about how the federal courts ought to exercise that power. 20 To illustrate, commentators have disagreed over whether the harmless error rule adopted in Chapman v. California 21 is better conceptualized as being rooted in the Constitution itself 22 or as constituting an example of the constitutional "common law" whose existence and legitimacy Professor Henry Monaghan has famously identified and defended. 23 Monaghan himself described the Chapman rule as an example of constitutional common law 24 -a body of sub-constitutional, judge-made doctrine that is "subject to [congressional] amendment, modification, or . . . reversal"
25
-and other commentators have agreed. 26 But even if a consensus were to emerge that the Chapman rule is indeed an example of constitutional common law, the debate would merely proceed to an even more fundamental disagreement over the rule's legitimacy. For there are those who strongly believe that judges lack the authority to make constitutional common law and must confine themselves to elaborating "true" constitutional meaning. 27 And it is difficult to defend Chapman as being a constitutionally compelled rule.
28 20 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 21 386 U.S. 18 (1967) . Chapman requires appellate courts to find that a constitutional trial error was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt" in order to disregard the error. See id. at 24; see also infra Part III.A.3. 22 See Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 424 n.31 (1980) (referring to the Chapman rule as a "constitutional judgment"). 23 See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975) (describing constitutional common law as a "substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions"). 24 See Henry P. Monaghan I acknowledge disagreements such as these. But I cannot express opinions on them, and defend those opinions, without turning this paper into a book. Therefore, I shall simply clarify at the outset three related points about my working premises and the paper's scope. First, I approach the problems addressed through the general law of remedies, which contains valuable lessons for the study of the more specific field of constitutional remedies. 29 Second, I take as a given the legitimacy of broad judicial discretion in fashioning constitutional remedies, for reasons amply and ably elaborated by others. 30 I shall not repeat their arguments here except as is necessary to contextualize my own. Third, for reasons I shall explain in Part IV, I see the law of substitutionary constitutional remedies as being most helpfully conceived as a body of sub-constitutional common law subject to legislative and judicial alteration; by contrast, I see the law of specific constitutional remedies as being more firmly rooted in the Constitution itself. 31 One additional point of initial clarification is also in order. In keeping with the paper's theme of function over form, I describe constitutional remedies in terms that emphasize the type of relief (functionally speaking) that they afford, and not in terms that focus attention on the particularized legal and equitable vehicles through which constitutional remedies historically have been provided. 32 law of constitutional remedies is almost entirely a matter of judge-made federal 'constitutional common law,' informed largely by the twin aims of redressing constitutional violations on an individual level and ensuring that government officials obey constitutional norms." (footnote omitted)). 32 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1778 (noting that remedies for constitutional violations have come through legal and equitable forms such as "damages, restitution, injunctions, mandamus, ejectment, declaratory judgments, exclusion of evidence, remand for retrial or reconsideration untainted by constitutional error, and writs of habeas corpus"). treatment, for example, to injunctions, declaratory judgments, or writs of mandamus or prohibition when I am discussing remedies that have the effect of causing a government actor to desist unconstitutional conduct or refrain from an imminent violation of rights. Rather, I group all such forms of relief together under more general headings such as "Nullification of Unconstitutional Laws by Subjects of Government Enforcement Actions" and "Remedies Ameliorating Other Ongoing or Imminent Constitutional Violations." 33 
II. A FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

A. A Need to Escape History
Although the historical practice of classifying remedies as either "legal" or "equitable" remains the norm, the historical practice often confuses far more than it clarifies. Professor Douglas Laycock, a leading expert on the law of remedies, explains why this is so:
The line between law and equity is largely the result of a bureaucratic fight for turf; each set of courts [i.e., the separate law and equity courts that existed both in England and throughout the United States prior to last century's merger of law and equity] took as much jurisdiction as it could get. Consequently, the line is jagged and not especially functional; it can only be memorized. Damages are the most important legal remedy; in general, compensatory and punitive remedies are legal. Injunctions and specific performance decrees are the most important equitable remedies; some of the specialized coercive remedies, such as mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus, are legal. Declaratory judgments were created by statute after the merger, so they are not classified either way; most of the older, more specialized declaratory remedies are equitable. Restitution was developed independently in both sets of courts; some restitutionary remedies are legal, some equitable, and some both.
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In an earlier edition of his casebook, 35 38 to encompass only remedies "that are typically available in equity," and not all remedies actually available in an equity court prior to the merger. 39 But in Great-West, Laycock persuasively demonstrates, the Court (again, in a 5-4 split) effectively adopted the latter, more technical meaning of the very same statutory provision. 40 Laycock uses this discussion of Mertens and Great-West to illustrate two broader themes that pervade his work. First, it often would be far more useful if Congress, judges, and commentators were to use functional, rather than historical, law/equity language when classifying constitutional remedies. 41 Second, functionally speaking, "[t]he most fundamental remedial choice is between substitutionary and specific remedies." 42 I agree. Therefore, in order to lay the groundwork for the analysis and arguments that follow, I start by classifying recognized constitutional remedies in functional terms, as either substitutionary or specific. Hopefully, the utility of this functional classification scheme will become apparent as readers proceed through the rest of the paper. 37 (2006) ). Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA may be found at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006) . 39 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256 (noting that "[a]s memories of the divided bench, and familiarity with its technical refinements, recede further into the past," it is less likely that Congress intended that the phrase "equitable remedies" be construed with historical precision). 40 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 568-69. I emphasize that this is Laycock's characterization of Great-West because the majority's opinion acknowledges no departure from Mertens. Indeed, Justice Scalia authored the majority opinions in both Mertens and GreatWest, and sought throughout the latter to emphasize its consistency with the former. See GreatWest, 534 U.S. at 209-20. 41 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 3. 42 Id. at 5 (quoting LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 12-13). Of course, remedies may also be classified as either prospective or retrospective, depending on how they operate. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) , employed this distinction to differentiate between those injunctions requiring the expenditure of state funds that may lawfully be entered against state officials under the doctrine recognized in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and those that are effectively suits against the State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman concluded that the Eleventh Amendment permits prospective injunctions of this sort but bars injunctions that operate retrospectively. See 415 U.S. at 664-70. The distinction between prospective and retrospective remedies has proved to be quite difficult to draw and rationalize in practice. See generally LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 475 ("The line between prospective and retrospective remedies is neither self-evident nor self-executing."); Amar, supra note 14, at 1480 (describing the Supreme Court's cases in the area as "incoherent"); Vicki C. 
B. Substitutionary and Specific Constitutional Remedies
There is an initial need to define terms. Laycock describes the difference between substitutionary and specific remedies as follows:
With substitutionary remedies, plaintiff suffers harm and receives a sum of money. Specific remedies seek to avoid this exchange. They aspire to prevent harm, or undo it, rather than let it happen and compensate for it. They seek to prevent harm to plaintiff, repair the harm in kind, or restore the specific thing that plaintiff lost. Substitutionary remedies include compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, restitution of the money value of defendant's gain, and punitive damages. Specific remedies include injunctions, specific performance of contracts, restitution of specific property, and restitution of a specific sum of money.
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Laycock's descriptive definitions of substitutionary and specific remedies are typical, 44 and they are helpful as far as they go. But typical definitions of substitutionary and specific remedies such as these are incomplete and inadequate for wholesale application in the unique context of constitutional remedies. For example, typical definitions may be taken to suggest that money is the only substitutionary remedy. 45 Yet this is inaccurate. Non-monetary substitutionary injunctions are sometimes available, 46 and there are other substitutionary constitutional remedies that are non-monetary. 47 In addition, substitutionary remedies are not inevitably compensatory, as typical definitions 43 LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 12-13. 44 See Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a "Specific" Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 122-23 & nn.14-15 (2006) (collecting common definitions); see also id. at 122-23 ("The difference between specific and substitutionary remedies can be further understood in terms of the plaintiff's rightful position-the position the plaintiff would hold if the defendant did not violate the plaintiff's legal rights. Specific relief achieves the plaintiff's rightful position exactly; substitutionary relief achieves only a rough approximation."). 45 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 6; see also 53 Such suits, which may initially be filed in either federal or state court, usually name as defendants the individual government actor who was the agent through whom the federal, state, or local government visited constitutional harm on the plaintiff. 54 Such "individual capacity" actions are pervasive because sovereign immunity shields the federal government from damages claims under Bivens 55 and because states and their subdivisions are not "persons" subject to suit within the meaning of Section 1983. 56 In fact, the only type of government entity subject to a suit for money damages for an alleged constitutional violation is a unit of local government such as a municipality. 57 But local government units are not liable for the conduct of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior.
58 Rather, they are subject to Section 1983 liability only when the plaintiff's injuries have been caused by an unlawful "policy or custom" 59 -a concept that has been narrowly defined and is therefore quite difficult to prove. 60 Thus, as already noted, most constitutional claims for money name individual defendants. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 54 
b. The Exclusion of Evidence Obtained as a Result of a Wholly Realized Constitutional Violation
The exclusion of evidence at trial in either federal or state court can either constitute a remedy for a wholly realized constitutional wrong or work to head off an imminent constitutional violation. Professor Arnold Loewy provides a succinct explanation of why this is so:
The exclusion of police-obtained evidence at a criminal trial can be justified by one of two theories. Under one theory, evidence is excluded because the police have unconstitutionally obtained the evidence and exclusion is thought desirable to deter such police behavior in the future by precluding a substantial benefit from such misconduct. Under the other theory, the evidence is excluded because the Constitution guarantees the defendant a procedural right to exclude the evidence. The former theory focuses on the constitutional impropriety of obtaining the evidence, while the latter theory's focus is on the constitutional impropriety of using that evidence at trial.
Put in remedial terms, the act of exclusion under the former theory constitutes substitutionary relief for a wholly realized constitutional violation committed at the time the evidence was obtained.
68 But the act of exclusion under the latter theory permits the moving party to receive that to which she is specifically entitled under the Constitution: avoidance of the procedural constitutional violation that would occur upon admission of the evidence. 69 The exclusion of evidence at trial has long been recognized in connection with violations of the Fourth, 70 he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one."). Such a wholly realized second constitutional violation can also only be remedied post hoc through the provision of a substitutionary remedy-reversal of any judgment of conviction that might follow the erroneous admission of evidence-on direct or collateral review. See infra Part II.B.1.c. 69 It seems odd to classify such an act of exclusion as a "remedy" because no constitutional violation has occurred and the situation is not analogous to a claim for pre-enforcement review of an unconstitutional statute that a government official has declared an intention to enforce. 83 See Loewy, supra note 67, at 933-37. 84 The Supreme Court has not decided whether a constitutional Miranda violation is complete at the time of the unlawful police conduct, or whether it becomes complete only with the admission at trial of evidence secured in violation of the required warnings. A plurality of the Court has taken the latter view, but the proposition has yet to garner majority support. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767, 772-73 (2003) (plurality opinion). 85 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 86 See 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004) (finding out-of-court, testimonial witness statements inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable and the accused had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness). Imagine here a judicial order barring the prosecution from using such a statement or instructing the jury to ignore any evidence of such a statement that might have been presented to it. 87 See 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (barring a prosecutor from asking the jury to draw an adverse inference from a criminal defendant's refusal to testify and barring a judge from instructing the jury that an adverse inference may be drawn from such silence). Imagine here also that the issue does not arise only in the criminal law context. To take a final example, a ruling, order, or instruction that works to protect the defendant from a jury award that would work a denial of due process under the rule announced in Philip Morris USA v. Williams 88 also avoids a procedural constitutional violation.
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The foregoing examples serve only to illustrate; they do not provide an exhaustive account of the range of possible scenarios in which requests for the exclusion of evidence or for the preclusion of argument or instruction raise issues of constitutional dimension.
c. Reversal of a Judgment Infected by Constitutional Error
As discussed in the preceding subsection, litigants often ask federal and state trial judges to provide substitutionary constitutional remedies and to issue rulings that enforce procedural guarantees that are based in the Constitution. 90 But what if a trial judge errs by admitting evidence that she should not have admitted and then subsequently enters a judgment that is adverse to the right-holder? Or what if a prosecutor or a criminal defense attorney acts to deprive a right-holder of procedural guarantees based in the Constitution, 91 and (again) a judgment subsequently enters that is adverse to the rightholder? Or what if the trial itself is marred by a constitutional error such as, to take only one of many possible examples, a jury instruction that effectively relieves the prosecution of its burden of proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt? 92 Whenever one of these things happens, a "constitutional" wrong has been committed. 93 In such circumstances, there is a wide array of procedural mechanisms that a judicial order instructing the jury to disregard a comment by the prosecutor that violated the rule established in Griffin. 88 549 U.S. 346 (2007) . 89 See id. at 353-55 (finding that a damage award punishing a defendant for injuring nonparties constitutes a taking of property without due process). Imagine here an instruction informing a jury presented with evidence that defendant's conduct harmed non-parties that it cannot punish the defendant for harm done to non-parties. Cf. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995) (holding that petitioner was not subject to a state law tolling provision that was struck down on constitutional grounds while a lawsuit against petitioner was pending). 90 See supra Part II.B. the right-holder may use to request reversal of the tainted judgment if she has preserved her claim for review. 94 The right-holder may, for example, seek relief from the trial court itself. 95 Or the right-holder may directly appeal the judgment and request reversal from an appellate court. 96 And in the case of a criminal judgment, the rightholder may also seek relief by means of a collateral attack on the tainted judgment. 97 Any relief obtained pursuant to such a procedural mechanism is substitutionary because the constitutional violation being challenged is concluded at the time of the post hoc challenge and because trials are not fungible. 98 Any new trial (or decision not to initiate a second trial) following an order reversing the judgment thus functions as a substitute for the wholly realized constitutional wrong.
d. Provisions of Structural Reform Injunctions That Are Unnecessary to Prevent or Undo a Constitutional Violation
In the decades since the Supreme Court's merits decision and remedial ruling in housing authorities have violated the individual constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and, in the case of class actions, of the plaintiff class. 100 These injunctions have required comprehensive changes to the defendant institutions. 101 Many provisions of the structural decrees that the Court has upheld, at least in the decades immediately following Brown, required relief that went well beyond preventing or undoing the underlying constitutional violation that justified judicial intervention. 102 Whether such provisions remain lawful today is, at best, an open question. In recent years, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that structural reform injunctions should be restorative in that they should seek only to place victims in the position they rightfully would have held but for the identified violation of the Constitution. 103 In any event, to the extent that injunctions may still lawfully contain provisions that outrun the scope of the underlying constitutional violation, such provisions are "substitutionary" in the sense that they provide the plaintiffs with something other than that to which the Constitution specifically entitles them. 955-58 (1978) . 103 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 310-36 (discussing how the law evolved in this direction in cases such as Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (striking down an injunction that ordered a multi-district desegregation remedy when only one school district had been adjudged a constitutional violator); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (striking down injunction that contained provisions that went far beyond restoring victims of unlawful segregation to the position they would have occupied absent such conduct); and Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (similar, with respect to an injunction that ordered significant upgrades to prison law libraries in Arizona)). Even in the Court's recent decision upholding an injunction requiring California to reduce its prison population, the rhetoric of necessity and narrow tailoring permeates the majority's analysis. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 Ct. , 1929 Ct. (2011 (noting that "courts may enter orders placing limits on a prison's population" when doing so is "necessary to ensure compliance with a constitutional mandate"); id. at 1940 (noting that the Court has "rejected remedial orders that unnecessarily reach out to improve prison conditions other than those that violate the Constitution"); id. at 1944 ("Of course, courts must not confuse professional standards with constitutional requirements."). 104 See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also 
a. Nullification of Unconstitutional Laws by Subjects of Government Enforcement Actions
There is no more basic and essential remedy for the violation of a constitutional right than a holding in favor of the subject of a government enforcement action that the federal or state law by which the government proceeds is unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied to the subject. 105 In the paradigmatic case, the subject is charged with a crime or subjected to a coercive civil enforcement action and asserts defensively the unconstitutionality of the law (again, facially or as applied) by which the government proceeds. 106 109 The second sentence of Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (APA), has been widely read to waive sovereign immunity with respect to official capacity claims against federal officials. Section 702 provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party. Id. That said, it is not entirely settled whether Section 702 of the APA waives sovereign immunity broadly, or only with respect to actions against federal officials that are brought under other provisions of the APA. But the recent and consistent trend in the federal courts of appeals has been to read the second sentence of Section 702 as a broad waiver of immunity and not one limited solely to actions brought under the APA. 112 When asserting one's rights in this way, either defensively or offensively, the subject of the enforcement action seeks the specific remedy of freedom from the unconstitutional constraint or coercion that would be worked by the challenged statute if it were enforced against the right-holder. 
b. Remedies Ameliorating Other Ongoing or Imminent Constitutional Violations
Victims of unconstitutional conduct may also seek prospective relief against government officials acting in their official capacities to ameliorate other ongoing or imminent violations of individual constitutional rights 114 who act, or will act imminently, in violation of the Constitution, and authorizing shareholders of a railroad subject to an imminent enforcement proceeding to enjoin by way of derivative suit the state official who was poised to enforce allegedly unconstitutional rate regulations).
111 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006) . The Act provides that, in a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, and subject to listed exceptions, "any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." Id. 112 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937) (requiring an "actual" controversy). Such actions typically face substantial hurdles under doctrines such as standing, ripeness, and abstention, and they are not common. But they do exist and are not impossible to win. Cf. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 725 (acknowledging there is "little clear authority for a general right to obtain anticipatory relief"). Compare, e.g., Seegars v. Gonzalez, 396 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting on justiciability grounds a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of District of Columbia firearms regulatory statutes), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (2006) , with Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 1997) (permitting portions of such a challenge to the constitutionality of provisions of the federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to proceed). 113 If the trial court denies the remedy, the subject may challenge the ruling on appeal or collateral review under procedural mechanisms such as those described in Part II.B.1.c. Obviously, an appeal or collateral attack on the judgment that succeeds in arguing for facial or as-applied nullification of the statute authorizing the underlying enforcement action provides the specific relief that the trial court should have provided. Therefore, such a successful appeal or collateral attack on the judgment differs qualitatively from the successful appeals and collateral attacks that yield substitutionary relief and are described in Part II.B. 120 The lawsuits demanding the structural reform of state and local public institutions, discussed above, 121 constitute paradigmatic examples of such claims against state officials under Section 1983. Of course, as already mentioned, the remedial decrees in this latter group of cases sometimes contained provisions that went beyond undoing or preventing the constitutional violation that warranted judicial intervention in the first instance. 122 But to the extent that the decrees also caused the responsible local officials to ameliorate the condition or conditions constituting the ongoing or imminent constitutional violation, whether by refraining from unconstitutional conduct or affirmatively undertaking constitutionally required action, they provided the plaintiffs (or the plaintiff class) with specific relief. Such relief is properly regarded as specific because it has the effect of freeing the plaintiffs from the effects of the ongoing or imminent invasion of their constitutional rights and restoring them to the position they rightfully would have held but for the constitutional violation. 
c. Habeas Corpus
The specific remedy of nullification of unconstitutional laws by subjects of government enforcement actions, discussed above, 123 is available when the government has either formally commenced enforcement proceedings or, if the subject files suit in anticipation of enforcement proceedings, is sufficiently likely to do so to render an anticipatory action justiciable. 124 But what if the government simply detains an individual without filing charges or providing the individual with access to a judicial officer? In such a situation, the detained individual is constitutionally entitled to access to a judicial officer to contest the detention by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (or any effectual substitute Congress devises). 125 Habeas corpus is available in such circumstances as a matter of constitutional right so long as (1) Congress has not lawfully suspended its availability, and (2) the petitioner would have had access to the writ under the same or similar circumstances in 1789. 126 The availability of access to a judicial officer through the writ of habeas corpus 127 is therefore a specific remedy authorized by the Constitution-one of two such remedies that the Constitution explicitly mentions.
d. "Just Compensation" for Takings
The other specific remedy that the Constitution explicitly mentions is found in the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 128 The It is important to bear in mind that the just compensation mandated by the Takings Clause is not a substitutionary remedy for an earlier, wholly realized constitutional violation. It is, rather, a specific remedy that the government must supply whenever it has "taken" property for public use. 130 Put another way, the constitutional violation does not occur upon the alleged taking; it takes place only if and when the government fails to provide the "just compensation" that the Constitution mandates in the event of a taking. Thus, a takings claim is in fact a claim for the specific constitutional remedy of "just compensation."
e. A Post-Deprivation Remedy for the Prior Coercive Collection of an Unconstitutional Tax, Custom, or Duty
There is a distinct class of cases that involve claims for the provision of a postdeprivation remedy for the prior collection of unconstitutional taxes or assessments.
The most common such remedy is a tax refund, such as that ordered in Ward v. Love County. 131 Another remedy, potentially available in cases where a tax is held to violate equal protection or dormant commerce clause principles by treating plaintiffs unfairly vis-à-vis another class of taxpayers, is the retroactive imposition of an equalizing tax on the previously favored taxpayers, such as that discussed in McKesson Corp. v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco.
132 Some combination of the two also is permissible.
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Claims for the provision of a post-deprivation tax remedy should be distinguished from claims in which a taxpayer seeks the specific remedy of nullification of an unconstitutional tax or the specific remedy of injunctive or declaratory relief invalidating the unconstitutional tax itself. 134 Claims for post-deprivation relief of the sort 129 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 130 See Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (observing that the Takings Clause "does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation"). 131 See 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (ordering a county to refund monies paid under a tax that the county commissioners lacked the constitutional power to enforce). 132 See 496 U.S. 18 (1990) (holding that the remedy for such a tax should be either a refund of the constitutionally excessive portion of the taxes paid or, to the extent otherwise consistent with the Constitution, the assessment and collection of back taxes on the previously favored class). 133 See id. at 39-41. 134 See supra Parts II.B.2.a-b. Such claims are often precluded by statute. State law frequently requires taxpayers who object to a tax on constitutional grounds to pay first and to litigate later, see FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1043, and the federal Tax Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from interfering with such state schemes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (limiting federal court jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of state described in this subsection can of course be joined with claims attacking the constitutionality of the tax itself (when such claims are permitted). 135 But the claims themselves are separate and distinct, and a claimant's entitlement to a means for obtaining a remedy, notwithstanding sovereign immunity, is separately rooted in the constitutional guarantee of due process.
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Why should a claim seeking a post-deprivation remedy for the prior coercive collection of an unconstitutional tax be regarded as seeking specific rather than substitutionary relief, given that the unlawful assessment and coercive collection are wholly concluded at the time the taxpayer seeks a post hoc remedy? The answer lies in the fact that the Supreme Court has identified the due process guarantee, and not the constitutional provision that the unlawful tax violated, as the source of the taxpayer's entitlement to a remedy. 137 A taxpayer who has paid an unconstitutional tax and is seeking a post-deprivation remedy as a matter of constitutional right-because the taxing entity has not provided her with a positive law mechanism for obtaining post-deprivation taxes); see also infra Part III.B.1. Moreover, the federal tax Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a) (2006) , prohibits any "suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax" unless the suit falls within one of fourteen specified exceptions. 135 See, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931) (involving (1) a claim that a tax on stock violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was higher than the tax imposed on the stock of competing domestic corporations, and (2) a separate request for a refund of the unconstitutionally excessive portion of the tax). 136 See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1994) (observing that "a denial by a state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 110 (noting that "the sovereign immunity States enjoy in federal court, under the Eleventh Amendment, does generally bar tax refund claims from being brought in that forum" (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459 (1945))).
In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), which held that Congress may not subject states to suit in their own courts absent their consent, the majority gave the recently and unanimously decided Reich a mysteriously narrow reading. The majority characterized the case as having held only that,
[D]espite its immunity from suit in federal court, a State which holds out what plainly appears to be "a clear and certain" postdeprivation remedy for taxes collected in violation of federal law may not declare, after disputed taxes have been paid in reliance on this remedy, that the remedy does not in fact exist. Id. at 740. For a discussion of how to read Reich in light of Alden, see FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 721. 137 Litigation has focused on the constitutionality of state rather than federal schemes because federal law provides a refund remedy pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006) . See United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511, 1514-15 (2008) (detailing how a taxpayer forced to pay an unlawful federal tax must seek a refund administratively before suing the government for a refund under the Tucker Act).
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[Vol. 21:857 relief on its own-is not making a direct claim for a substitutionary remedy for the effects of the unconstitutional tax under Bivens or Section 1983. She is, rather, seeking a constitutional entitlement that is being withheld as an ongoing matter: the due process guarantee of an effective post-deprivation remedy for persons in her position. And as we have seen, a request for a constitutional entitlement that is being withheld as an ongoing matter is a request for a specific constitutional remedy.
C. Summary
From the discussion above, we see that there is a strong correlation between the discretionary acts of individual government agents who violate the Constitution and substitutionary constitutional remedies. Because such discretionary acts usually cannot be challenged in real time or in advance of their occurrence, 138 the violation is typically wholly realized by the time the affected party challenges it in court. And remedies for wholly realized constitutional violations are by their nature substitutionary.
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By contrast, we see a nearly perfect identity between ongoing unconstitutional governmental policies and customs-governmental positions taken in statutes, regulations, informal policy, and through the modus operandi of those who function as government policymakers-and specific constitutional remedies. Specific constitutional remedies are by their nature available to address only ongoing or imminent violations, and not violations that are wholly concluded. In the constitutional law context, such ongoing or imminent violations are almost invariably worked by policies and customs rising to the level of unconstitutional "law," and not the discretionary unconstitutional "conduct" of government agents. Thus, we may generalize that specific constitutional remedies are the typical means by which courts directly 140 halt ongoing or imminent 138 Limitations on the standing doctrine make anticipatory challenges of this sort nearly impossible. See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (denying standing to a victim of an allegedly unconstitutional chokehold to bring a prospective challenge against the legality of the practice). 139 There are exceptions to the generalization that claims for substitutionary relief target wholly realized wrongs. For example, a suit for money damages against a municipality under Section 1983 is a claim for substitutionary relief to compensate for harm caused not by the wholly realized discretionary act of a government agent, but for the harm caused by an unconstitutional custom or policy that may well be causing ongoing harm to the right-holder. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text. So too may a claim for substitutionary relief target an unconstitutional law and not discretionary conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (authorizing reversals of criminal convictions affected by unconstitutional provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
140 I say "directly" because a substitutionary remedy can indirectly cause government authorities to cease and desist in enforcing an unconstitutional policy or custom. For example, a damage award that compensates a plaintiff for harm done by an unconstitutional municipal custom or policy, see, e.g., supra note 139, would doubtless lead to a cessation of the policy in question, even in the absence of a concomitant injunction striking down the custom or policy. violations of constitutional rights, which usually take place in the form of some sort of unconstitutional law (broadly defined) affecting the liberty or property interests of the right-holder.
III. THE WITHHOLDING OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
A. Doctrines Limiting the Availability of Substitutionary Constitutional Remedies
For each type of substitutionary constitutional remedy available to ameliorate a wholly realized constitutional wrong, the Supreme Court has developed one or more doctrines that require courts to withhold remedies in circumstances where there has been a violation of rights. And in each case, the Court has been clear that the limits it is imposing are rooted in public interest balancing. 
Individual Immunity Doctrines
It is well known that the availability of damages remedies from agents of the federal government under Bivens, 142 and from agents of state and local governments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 143 is significantly circumscribed. 144 As an initial matter, a number of public officials simply do not qualify as persons subject to a claim for damages under Bivens or Section 1983; they are said be cloaked in absolute immunity. 145 As matters presently stand, absolute immunity protects legislators acting in a legislative capacity, 146 In addition, those government actors who are not protected by absolute immunity are entitled to a qualified immunity from suit and damages liability under Bivens and Section 1983. Qualified immunity was originally formulated as a doctrine that protected individual government actors from liability when their conduct, although in violation of the Constitution, met two relatively demanding requirements: (1) there existed objectively reasonable grounds for the defendant to conclude that the challenged action was lawful "at the time and in light of all the circumstances," 151 and (2) the defendant acted in "good faith" and with a sincere belief that he was doing right.
152 But in 1982, the Supreme Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 153 which eliminated the requirement of subjective good faith and transformed the doctrine into one that protects all defendants whose conduct was objectively reasonable in light of "clearly established" law at the time that it was undertaken. 154 The Harlow Court was candid in explaining that it was changing the law because of an overriding policy consideration: a perceived need to secure quicker dismissals of civil rights claims so that government actors would not be over-deterred in performing their duties by the threats of burdensome discovery and having to face unmeritorious claims at trial. 155 In subsequent years, the Court expanded the reach of the doctrine by emphasizing its broad scope 156 and insisting that courts define rights at a very high level of specificity in determining whether they are "clearly established." 157 Finally, the Court has also strongly suggested, although it has not held, that private parties who are not government actors, but who nonetheless stand accused of unconstitutionally exercising government power under the state action doctrine, may be entitled to avoid liability through a "good faith" defense. 158 Private parties are not entitled to assert the specialized qualified immunity defense available to government 151 actors. 159 But such a good faith defense would likely overlap substantially, and perhaps be coextensive with, the qualified immunity defense. 160 Because many of the cases in which these immunity doctrines were identified involved claims under Section 1983, 161 one might question whether it is appropriate to label the resultant doctrines as products of judicial lawmaking rooted in public interest balancing and not liability limits evident in, or inferable from, the text of the statute itself. But these doctrines cannot plausibly be seen as interpretations of Section 1983. First, many of the most important doctrinal developments in individual immunity law have occurred in the non-statutory Bivens context and then simply been applied to damages claims under Section 1983.
162 Second, the Court has itself acknowledged that Section 1983 "creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities," 163 and it has explained its immunity doctrines in terms that heavily emphasize the vital role played by public interest concerns: "[W]e have accorded certain government officials . . . immunity . . . if the 'tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted in the common law and was supported by such strong policy reasons that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.'" 164 Third, and most importantly, the Court has been clear that, in elaborating the scope of these immunities, it sees itself as free to advance the perceived public interest; it is not constrained by the dictates of history and the traditions on which the immunities are loosely based. 165 The individual immunity doctrines that limit the recovery of damages 
Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has developed an exclusionary rule that presumptively requires the suppression of evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. 166 The purpose of the rule is, of course, to deter government officials from disregarding Fourth Amendment rights. 167 But the Court also has held that exclusion pursuant to the rule is not a personal constitutional right of the accused and is not inevitably warranted. 168 The Court has repeatedly invoked this latter proposition to justify a number of "exceptions" to the rule: the "good faith" exceptions recognized in United States v. Leon 173 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009) (authorizing the admission of evidence obtained through a merely negligent disregard of Fourth Amendment rights, and holding that exclusion should follow only police conduct that can be described as deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent-or that can be traced to recurring or systemic negligence-with respect to Fourth Amendment rights).
174 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that a violation of the Fourth Amendment's "knock-andannounce" rule does not require exclusion of the evidence found in the search that followed the violation).
as additional examples of the Court fashioning doctrines that withhold substitutionary constitutional remedies under reasoning rooted in public interest balancing.
The Non-Retroactivity Principle of Teague v. Lane
The non-retroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane 193 is much the same. The Teague principle is best understood in the context of the development of the law of retroactivity in criminal procedure. Traditionally, judicial decisions creating new law were applied retroactively to the parties and to other litigants in pending cases that had not yet become "final."
194 The Warren Court, however, developed criminal procedure doctrines that permitted it to render constitutional decisions that would not apply retroactively in certain circumstances. 195 Justice Harlan strongly criticized these doctrines 196 and argued that courts should apply all decisions retroactively on direct review. 197 He conceded, however, that a state's policy interest in finality almost always trumps this imperative on collateral review. 198 He thus engaged in a form of cost-benefit analysis to suggest that new decisions should apply retroactively on collateral review only where the decision (1) holds "previously punishable conduct to be constitutionally protected," or (2) recognizes a right of procedure that is "so fundamental as to be 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. '" 199 Justice Harlan's position ultimately prevailed. In Griffith v. Kentucky, 200 the Court held that all new rules of criminal procedure should be fully retroactive on direct review. 201 And in Teague, the Court effectively accepted the Justice's policy trump, the powerful norm that courts should freely grant specific remedies to ameliorate ongoing or imminent violations of constitutional rights.
Judicial Federalism Doctrines
The Supreme Court has identified a number of circumstances in which lower federal courts should not provide litigants with a remedy-specific or otherwise-even if a claimant can establish an ongoing or imminent violation of her constitutional rights. Sometimes, lower federal courts must decline to proceed because Congress has imposed limitations on federal court intrusion into pending state court proceedings. Examples of such statutory limitations include the federal Anti-Injunction Act, 206 Moreover, the Court has itself developed a number of federalism doctrines that work to limit lower federal court jurisdiction over claims that fall within the literal terms of congressional grants of jurisdiction.
209 Some but not all of these doctrines can operate to deflect from federal court jurisdiction justiciable claims for specific relief for ongoing or imminent constitutional infringements that, absent federalism concerns, would be entirely appropriate for federal adjudication. 210 Examples of doctrines that The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made by a State administrative agency or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision, where:
(1) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the order to the Federal Constitution; and, (2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and, (3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing; and, (4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. For a discussion of the Johnson Act of 1934, including an extension of its proscriptions to declaratory judgment and damages actions, see FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1042-43. 208 The Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) , provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." See also supra note 134. For a discussion of the scope and breadth of the Tax Injunction Act, including how its proscriptions have been extended to declaratory judgment and damages actions in both federal and state court, see FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1043-49. 209 See FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1049-151, 1311-53. 210 For example, there is a recognized doctrine that requires exhaustion of state nonjudicial remedies. See id. at 1050-57. But this doctrine generally does not apply to actions under 42 instead seek relief from a state court-substitutionary or specific-that cannot be withheld as a matter of due process. 216 
Statutory Preclusion
The Supreme Court also has recognized that Congress has the authority to enact statutes that preclude otherwise justiciable and proper claims seeking specific constitutional relief and divert such claims into alternative and exclusive statutory or administrative enforcement regimes. One example, already mentioned, requires claimants seeking a refund for an unconstitutional federal tax to forgo a claim for specific relief and to seek an administrative refund remedy before suing the United States. 217 Another was validated in Yakus v. United States, 218 where the Court upheld legislation prohibiting a criminal defendant from seeking nullification of the law authorizing the prosecution where the defendant had already had an opportunity to challenge it in a prior administrative proceeding. 219 But again, in each instance, the refusal to provide relief was rooted in an imperative of constitutional structure-i.e., the obligation under separation of powers concerns to honor congressional authority over remedies-and not in any expressed judicial concern about the effect that the relief sought might have on the public interest. Moreover, as with the judicial federalism doctrines, the Court has emphasized that an entirely different question would be presented if the preclusive and diversionary statute would have the effect of extinguishing the claim for a constitutional remedy altogether. Parts II and III have shown that the modern Supreme Court frequently exercises its normative and allocative discretion with respect to public interest balancing 227 to formulate doctrines that require lower courts to withhold substitutionary constitutional relief and to leave wholly realized constitutional harms entirely without a remedy. They also have shown that, in contrast, the modern Court has treated the provision of specific constitutional remedies as routine, at least in cases where neither a judicial federalism nor a statutory preclusion doctrine applies. And even in these rather exceptional cases, the Court has expressed an unwillingness to countenance the withholding of remedies altogether; instead, it has emphasized that "serious constitutional concerns" would ensue if effective constitutional relief were unavailable in the alternative forums to which it has redirected some claimants pressing claims for specific relief.
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This final Part considers whether it is appropriate to draw from the described judicial behavior and statements any conclusions with respect to constitutionally necessary remedies. 229 The topic is vast, and it will require another paper to fully explore whether the Court's willingness to engage in public interest balancing to withhold substitutionary, but not specific, constitutional remedies tracks a firm constitutional limit on judicial and congressional remedial prerogative. 230 But with that caveat, I believe that the differential treatment the Court accords such remedies with respect to public 225 See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009-13. For an analysis of "proxy" enforcement of the Constitution in and through sub-constitutional regimes such as the examples just discussed, see John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REV. 1663 REV. (2009 . 226 See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012 n.15 (emphasizing that the statutory remedy simply replaced the constitutional one and that " [t] here is no issue here of Congress' ability to preclude the federal courts from granting a remedy for a constitutional deprivation"). 227 See supra note 9. 228 See supra notes 215-16 & 226 and accompanying text. 229 For a summary of views on constitutionally necessary remedies, see supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. 230 See Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 10, at 1104-05 (opining that a comprehensive theory of constitutionally necessary remedies would likely require book-length treatment).
interest balancing supports a two-part hypothesis. First, substitutionary constitutional remedies, while integral as a class to the proper functioning of our constitutional order, are properly regarded as individually contingent; such remedies are susceptible to legislative or judicial expansion, contraction, or replacement as the perceived public interest dictates. Second, specific constitutional remedies should be freely available for most justiciable and meritorious claims of constitutional right. Moreover, an effective constitutional remedy should be available from the alternative forum in those exceptional cases where claimants seeking specific relief are legitimately subject to diversion from federal court by a judicial federalism or statutory preclusion doctrine. And public interest balancing should not be employed in connection with claims for specific constitutional relief.
Obviously, the fact that the Supreme Court has engaged in public interest balancing to fashion doctrines requiring lower courts to withhold each type of substitutionary constitutional remedy goes a very long way towards refuting any descriptive claim that such remedies are constitutionally mandatory. Indeed, if one eschews purely normative or historical argument and seeks to develop a theory of constitutionally necessary remedies that rationalizes what the modern Court actually has done, one simply cannot maintain that a wholly realized violation of an individual constitutional right requires, ipso facto, a damages award, the subsequent exclusion of evidence, the reversal of a tainted conviction, or (most obviously) a structural reform injunction containing constitutionally extraneous provisions. The now well-established doctrines limiting the availability of these substitutionary constitutional remedies, discussed above, 231 render such an argument difficult to sustain.
The argument that substitutionary constitutional remedies are constitutionally contingent also survives a shift in perspective from the descriptive to the normative. Certainly, the elimination without replacement of any one class of substitutionary constitutional remedy-let alone the wholesale elimination of all classes of such remedies-would raise a very serious constitutional issue. And just as certainly, the curtailment or elimination of certain substitutionary constitutional remedies would raise graver concerns than the curtailment or elimination of other substitutionary constitutional remedies; the necessity of any one type of substitutionary constitutional remedy surely should vary depending on the nature of the underlying violation that is alleged. 232 Even so, there are several reasons for treating substitutionary constitutional remedies-as a class-as inherently contingent and subject to legitimate alteration by Congress or the Supreme Court.
Substitutionary constitutional remedies are often and accurately described as species of sub-constitutional common law because they lack the textual and historical rights through specific relief protects constitutional structure in much the same way that the enforcement of structure through the power of judicial review can protect individual rights. 239 As already discussed, specific remedies tend to be available only in situations where the government action being challenged is undertaken pursuant to some "law"-i.e., some policy or custom directly attributable to one of the political branches of the federal and state governments. 240 Thus, specific remedies reasonably may be seen as more essential than their substitutionary counterparts for keeping the coordinate federal branches and the states within constitutional boundaries at the lawmaking level.
One final point is also worth noting. The most comprehensive descriptive account of constitutionally necessary remedies to be found in the academic literature-an analysis provided by Professor Fallon in a recent Virginia Law Review article 241 -is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that this Part advances. Fallon begins by noting the primacy of Professor Henry Hart's observation that complaints about the preclusion of a particular remedy "can rarely be of constitutional dimension." 242 But Fallon then observes that Hart, who wrote in 1953 before the explosion of substitutionary constitutional remedies and related doctrines that occurred during and after the Warren Court years, was troubled by the notion that constitutional remedies could be withheld altogether. 243 Fallon draws on this background to describe the theory of constitutionally necessary remedies that he and Professor Meltzer proposed in 1991-that there be a rebuttable presumption in favor of effective relief in all cases, and a sufficient scheme of remedies to keep government officials answerable to the demands of the Constitution 244 -as being designed to harmonize modern doctrinal reality (in which constitutional remedies are often withheld) with Hart's claims about constitutional remedies. 245 
